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Abstract: Underneath the veneer of a homogenous state-approved Thai ethnicity, Thailand is home to 
a heterogeneous population. Only about one-third of Thailand’s inhabitants speak the national language 
as their mother tongue; multiple alternate ethnolinguistic groups comprise the remainder of the 
population, with the Lao in the northeast, often called Isan people, being the largest at 28 percent of the 
population. Ethnic divisions closely align with areas of political party strength: the Thai Rak Thai Party 
and its subsequent incarnations have enjoyed strong support from Isan people and Khammuang 
speakers in the north while the Democrat Party dominates among the Thai- and Paktay-speaking people 
of the central plains and the south. Despite this confluence of ethnicity and political party support, we 
see very little mobilization along ethnic cleavages. Why? I argue that ethnic mobilization remains 
minimal because of the large-scale public acceptance and embrace of the government-approved Thai 
identity. Even among the country’s most disadvantaged, such as Isan people, support is still strong for 
“Thai-ness.” Most inhabitants of Thailand espouse the mantra that to be Thai is superior to being 
labelled as part of an alternate ethnic group. I demonstrate this through the application of largescale 
survey data as well as a set of interviews with self-identified Isan people. The findings suggest that the 
Thai state has successfully inculcated a sense of national identity among the Isan people and that ethnic 
mobilization is hindered by ardent nationalism.   
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Over the past two decades, a clear political schism has emerged in Thailand. Recent electoral maps 
present bright red in the north and northeast, strongholds of the Pheu Thai Party, and deep blue in the 
Democratic Party’s bastions of Bangkok and the southern provinces,1 signalling the apparent rise of a 
two-party system.2 These boundaries closely align with economic divisions, where the north and 
northeast are relatively poor compared to the central and south regions.3 Furthermore, party and 
economic cleavages correlate with ethnolinguistic maps that lump the people of the north and northeast 
together as speaking languages closely related to Lao in contrast with the Thai-speaking populations in 
the central plains and the south.4 Political party lines seem to have converged geographically with these 
ethnic boundaries, showing a confluence of socioeconomic divisions, ethnicity, and party.  
 
Despite these overlaps, ethnicity remains largely outside the realm of Thai political discourse. Owing 
to a long history of central government domination and unification,5 such cleavages appear apolitical. 
Even so, scholars continue to identify the importance of ethnic distinctions, especially those of Isan, a 
term applied to the northeast region, its inhabitants who are ethnically Lao (khon Isan), and the local 
version of the Lao language (phasa Isan).6 These  differences, though, do not appear regularly in national 
political discourse or campaigns. Although their support bases align with distinct regions, political 
parties refrain from making explicit ethnic appeals, instead relying on economic or personalistic 
overtures.7 This poses a puzzle, as research has shown that when ethnic groups, especially those that 
align with socioeconomic inequalities, are excluded from political power, there is high potential for the 
emergence of ethnic campaigns.8 Why, with a sufficiently large and coherent Isan population, do we 
not see ethnicity-based political mobilization?  
 
I contend that ethnic mobilization remains minimal because of the extensive public adoption of a 
government-approved Thai identity. Over a century of state-directed nation-building efforts have 
convinced the Lao people of northeastern Thailand of their “Thai-ness” (khwampen Thai), wherein 
ethnic identities have been subsumed within a national narrative. Indeed, the fact that alternate tongues, 
including phasa Isan, are today referred to as “regional dialects” rather than distinct languages is a 
symbol of the state’s achievements.9 Broad-scale pride in being Thai has precluded ethnicity-based 
mobilization.  
 
This essay builds on a growing literature concerning Isan identity as well as the theoretical literature on 
ethnic peace, arguing that the process of Thai nation-building has subsumed ethnicity within a broader 
nationalist narrative. I provide expanded evidence of the breadth of Isan people’s adoption of the Thai 
identity by drawing on multiple rounds of largescale surveys conducted in Thailand. These surveys 
demonstrate that Isan people have a very positive view of their Thai identity, ranking their feelings of 
Thai-ness higher than their counterparts from other regions. Furthermore, I present findings from a 
series of semistructured interviews among self-identified khon Isan to gain greater leverage on their 
perceptions of identity. Both the quantitative and qualitative evidence suggest that Thai nationalism can 
trump ethnic identity and hinder mobilization.10  
 
These findings provide two main contributions. First, recent work in political science has approached 
ethnic conflict through the alternate channel of ethnic peace, emphasizing factors such as nationalism 
that allow for the stable coexistence of ethnic groups.11 Isan people’s embrace of the Thai national 
identity demonstrates the capacity of a determined state to tame alternate identities and inculcate a belief 
in homogenous nationhood. In other words, the integration of Lao ethnics in Thailand provides some 
insights into one path toward ethnic peace. Second, a growing literature in Thai studies investigates the 
incorporation of Isan people into the Thai nation, but scholars somewhat disagree as to the effectiveness 
of the state’s nation-building efforts, with some highlighting Isan people’s quiet resistance to the state12 
and others suggest a more successful incorporation.13 The empirics presented here provide additional 
evidence, demonstrating the breadth and depth of Isan people’s assimilation as Thais.  
 
The remainder of this essay is structured as follows: I next discuss the theoretical foundations of the 
argument and provide a brief overview of Thailand’s ethnic environment before turning to a discussion 
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of the Thai state’s extensive efforts to unify all citizens under a single Thai identity. I then demonstrate 
the success of these government policies, through both quantitative and qualitative data. I conclude the 
essay with a discussion of the implications of these findings.   
  
 
Conditions for Ethnic Mobilization and the Northeastern Context   
A classic question in political science concerns which societal cleavages become politically salient, 
whether these be based in religion, ethnicity, class, ideology, or some other societal division.14 Ethnic 
cleavages figure prominently in the literature, and many scholars consider ethnicity a relatively easy 
arena for political mobilization: “In general, ethnic identity is strongly felt, behavior based on ethnicity 
is normatively sanctioned, and ethnicity is often accompanied by hostility toward outgroups.”15 Political 
conduct based on ethnic cleavages includes both violent acts like riots and secessionist movements16 as 
well as more peaceful political participation, such as involvement in political parties or voting as an 
ethnic bloc.17  
 
A variety of circumstances encourage ethnic mobilization. Ethnic groups that are perpetually excluded 
from both socioeconomic advancement as well as government representation of their ethnic interests 
are more likely to organize politically.18 Coherent ethnic boundaries also encourage the emergence of 
ethnic parties, as a well-defined group can serve as a source of party loyalty as well as a shortcut for 
identifying the policy and material interests of its members.19 Furthermore, if an ethnic group is large 
enough that its support can ensure participation in the governing coalition, especially when 
geographically concentrated, then it is likely to be an attractive source of backing for politicians.20 
Rational political entrepreneurs would choose to campaign on ethnic terms in order to take advantage 
of this potential pool of voters. If a country contains an ethnic group that is adequately populous to 
provide a viable voting bloc, sufficiently distinct, and suffers economic and political disadvantages, 
then conditions are ripe for ethnic mobilization in the political sphere.  
 
At a theoretical level we can apply these conditions to northeastern Thailand and evaluate the extent to 
which we might expect ethnic mobilization to occur. First, if we consider population size and 
concentration, Isan people fit the characteristics of a potential power base for a political leader. Despite 
perceptions that Thailand is largely homogenous, the country houses a diverse population, with the most 
prominent indicator of ethnicity being language.21 Slightly less than 40 percent of the population speaks 
central Thai at home; of these almost one-fourth are ethnic Chinese who have adopted the language.22 
Of the remaining population, the largest alternative ethnic groups are the Lao people of Isan (28 percent 
of the population), Khammuang speakers in the north (10 percent of the population), and Paktay 
speakers located in the south (9 percent of the population).23 Making up almost one-third of the 
population and being geographically concentrated in a specific region means that the Isan population, 
if mobilized to vote along ethnic lines, would provide an important block of seats for a parliamentary 
coalition. Indeed, as Joel Selway has demonstrated, similar electoral rules to Thailand’s 1979–1997 
block vote system resulted in enduring ethnic mobilization in Mauritius.24 After 1997, the creation of 
single-member districts throughout the country as well as the party list system would have also allowed 
for an Isan-based party to successfully obtain approximately 30 percent of parliamentary seats. Thus, 
ethnic mobilization would have made some sense in the Thai context based on group size and 
geographic concentration.  
 
Second, an Isan identity has persisted and strengthened, counter to the official Thai discourse.25 While 
Isan people must negotiate their identities within the official requirements of the Thai state, “being Isan” 
became more prominent during the 1990s and 2000s.26 The identity is sufficiently coherent that Isan 
linguistic appeals have been shown to be more effective in garnering political support than overtures in 
central Thai.27 While it is difficult to establish a threshold strength for ethnic mobilization, it does appear 
that the Isan identity is strong enough to serve as a base for electoral politics.  
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Third, Isan people have experienced both economic and political exclusion from the Thai state. The 
region lags behind the rest of the country’s economy. State interventions to alleviate poor economic 
outcomes in the northeast were historically driven primarily by security concerns, especially the 
potential rise of communism during the period from the 1950s to the 1970s, rather than an interest in 
the welfare of Isan people.28 The Thai state pushed development projects to win the hearts and minds 
of the people, but this strategy was relatively ineffective in promoting economic growth. Instead many 
locals suffered both implied and real slights at the hands of government officials from central 
Thailand.29 As Thailand’s economy boomed in the 1980s and 1990s, the northeast trailed behind. 
Although poverty fell dramatically, it became regionally concentrated, especially in the northeast, 
where “poverty incidence was at least 50 percent in excess of the national average.”30  
 
Politically, Isan people have not fared much better. The idea of a regional political party was floated in 
the late 1950s, but this was suppressed by successive military regimes, which saw a politically active 
Isan as a threat to the Thai nation and responded with counterinsurgency programs and suppression 
rather than inclusion in the body politic.31 Promising Isan leaders who gained political reputations in 
the 1940s were silenced by the state, with multiple members of parliament from the region being 
executed between the late 1940s and early 1960s.32 Other political movements have failed to take root, 
with the most long-lasting political organizations being based on prominent families and personalistic 
appeals, such as the Chidchob clan in Burriram, rather than ethnic mobilization. In the 1990s, an attempt 
to build the New Aspiration Party in the region failed to take on an Isan character.33 Both the Thai Rak 
Thai and Pheu Thai party organizations, which relied heavily on Isan people for support, displayed few 
Isan leaders. Even the Red Shirt movement, with a strong northeastern following, is piloted by nonIsan 
political figures.34 Appeals to the Isan people do not rely on descriptive representation, and an Isan 
identity remains absent from national politics.  
 
Under these conditions it would seem that the region is primed for ethnic mobilization. Yet it has not 
occurred. This is certainly not due to any devolution of power or regional autonomy,35 as the Thai state 
remains highly centralized. Nor can we completely blame the design of electoral rules.36 Instead, the 
answer to a lack of ethnic mobilization can be found in the Thai state’s nation-building process.   
  
Homogenizing Thailand   
Research on peaceful multi-ethnic societies has recently highlighted the role of nation-building in 
surmounting potential ethnic cleavages, as strong feelings of nationalism can overcome ethnic 
boundaries and decrease demands for ethnicity-based benefits, reducing the propensity for ethnic 
conflict.37 Two key components to this process are social closure as well as linguistic homogenization. 
First, social closure refers to the degree to which an ethnic group’s boundaries are exclusive and 
impermeable.38 Higher degrees of social closure, especially between the metropole group and 
minorities, translate into stark divides and social and political exclusion of alternate ethnic groups. 
Social closure can encourage conflict between ethnic groups while porous identities encourage peaceful 
coexistence. Second, monolingualism serves as a powerful component of nation-building.39 If “the 
entire population is schooled in the same curriculum with the same underlying nationalist message, 
irrespective of the actual languages spoken by the population,” nation-building will be more effective 
in overcoming the centripetal forces of ethnicity.40 In essence, a centralized nation-building process 
including low levels of social closure as well as standardized language training can circumvent the 
propensity for ethnic mobilization.  
 
Thailand’s experience echoes these claims. The Thai state has been very careful to standardize and 
centralize language training as well as officially refrain from social closure by absorbing alternate 
ethnicities into Thai-ness.41 This process began in the 1890s, when the Thai state initiated a century-
long series of government policies designed to assimilate populations located within Thai borders under 
a single, government-approved Thai ethnicity.42 The Thai elite, a relatively homogenous group, used 
their social position and dominance over the political system to reward those who adopted and embraced 
their version of Thai-ness through creating an “official nationalism,”43 which operated via a few 
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mechanisms, including the creation of an ethnic and linguistic hierarchy wherein the state-approved 
Thai identity enjoys higher status and recognition than any other identity. The hierarchy, though, was 
permeable. Those who wished to become Thai could do so by abandoning previous ethnic affiliations. 
This held for both Chinese immigrants as well as native inhabitants of the country; those who 
surrendered their former ethnicity in favour of Thai-ness enjoyed upward social mobility.44 Kukrit 
Pramoj, a member of the elite who also served briefly as prime minister, explained the fluid nature of 
Thai-ness:   
  
A Thai is not a person who is born by blood … if you do something to yourself, then you 
become a Thai. [This] means you accept Thai values, Thai ideals, mostly you become a 
Buddhist … you are loyal to the king and … to the Thai nation...  
  
The hierarchy placed being Thai at the pinnacle of society, but the gates of Thai-ness were 
hypothetically open to all who conformed to the requirements.  
 
Crucial to the hierarchy was language, and central or Standard Thai became privileged above the 
alternative languages which served as the primary indicators of ethnicity.46 The Thai state spread 
Standard Thai throughout the country via a centralized curriculum, reducing the perception of the 
language’s exclusivity. Learning and speaking Standard Thai became a vital component of being Thai.47 
Acting as a carrot for alternate ethnicities within the Thai geo-body, the high status of the Thai ethnicity 
encouraged its adoption, primarily through language.  
 
On the other hand, creating “Thai-ness” involved identifying non-Thais as a threat to national security, 
and, as such, the cultural diversity found within the boundaries of the Thai state was a danger to be 
overcome and defeated.48 Consolidation of Thai identity began under the centralizing reforms of King 
Chulalongkorn (1868–1910) and continued after the fall of the absolute monarchy, in large part thanks 
to successive military governments. Policies included forced standardization of language, religion, 
social practices, and even changing the name of the country from Siam to Thailand to better align the 
Thai ethnicity with the country’s boundaries.49 Regional movements were also crushed, including the 
brutal quelling of the northeast’s Holy Man rebellion in 190250 as well as suppression of Buddhist 
movements in the north, most famously the large following of Khruba Sriwichai.51 Later, as mentioned 
above, under military dictatorship in the late 1940s and the 1950s, political leaders from the northeast, 
as well as other regions, were brutally murdered by the state to reduce challenges to the centralized Thai 
authority.52  
 
Punishments for not being satisfactorily “Thai” continue today. The current military dictator Prayuth 
Chan-ocha, frustrated with a lack of support for his policies, has accused both adversaries and skeptics 
of not being Thai.53 Such allegations are dangerous, as “being defined as non-Thai can have fatal 
consequences.”54 The Thai identity can also threaten alternate political camps. To be castigated as being 
insufficiently Thai has become a political weapon.  
 
The omnipresent force of Thai-ness has found its way into both political and societal discourses. Indeed, 
politicians effectively used appeals to national unity as part of their efforts to encourage political 
support. Prominent examples include the naming of Thaksin Shinawatra’s political party “Thais Love 
Thais” (Thai Rak Thai) and its successors “For Thais” (Pheu Thai) and “Thais Save the Nation” (Thai 
Raksa Chart).55 On the opposite side of the political spectrum, Suthep Thaugsuban also called on 
national pride during his “Shutdown Bangkok, Restart Thailand” campaign, adorning himself with flags 
and calling on “Thai brothers and sisters” (phinong chao Thai) to stand up against the absent Thaksin. 
Beyond politics, the embrace of Thai-ness has been popularized, evidenced in a broad swath of musical 
numbers, including the rock group Carabao’s well-known chorus, “Are you Thai?” (khon Thai rue 
plao).56  
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Thus, the Thai state created an absorbent Thai national identity, allowing for assimilation of alternate 
ethnic groups. This was reinforced by homogenizing the national language through a centralized 
education curriculum. Enforcement included the castigation, both political and social, of alternative 
identities using violent means. Over a century’s worth of government policy has been designed to 
neutralize challenges from alternative ethnic groups and promote a uniform, state-sanctioned Thai-ness. 
Now we turn to the data to better understand the impact of these efforts.   
  
Being Proud to Be Thai  
  
Scholars of Thailand have debated the magnitude of Isan people’s integration into the Thai state. Charles 
Keyes depicts Isan people accepting their Thai-ness largely in response to top-down policies by the 
state education system to define them as Thai as well as their own efforts to engage in the broader 
economy.57 As the Isan population has become an active force in Thai politics, especially in recent 
decades, their involvement has been based on economic claims rather than ethnic or regional 
mobilization.58 Similarly, Somchai Phatharathananunth’s research into radicalism in the Isan found that, 
despite the growth of an ethno-regional consciousness and continued resistance to the Thai state, 
“Bangkok was able to secure the loyalty of Isan people to the Thai nation.”59 Saowanee Alexander, 
Duncan McCargo, and Krisadawan Hongladarom have offered a different perspective, contending that 
the Lao people of the northeast are engaged in defining and redefining their identities, frequently in 
opposition to the Thai state.60 Thus, the literature exhibits a nuanced division, acknowledging that the 
Lao people of the northeast have integrated as Thai citizens, but differing in their interpretation of the 
degree of Isan people’s acceptance of Thai national identity.  
 
Building on this literature, I use large-scale surveys to further investigate these claims. Appealing to a 
series of surveys that have been conducted throughout Thailand, I demonstrate that Isan speakers, in 
general, exhibit even higher levels of national pride and identification with the Thai identity than their 
compatriots. The scale and representativeness of these surveys give added credence to the claim that 
Isan people are proud to be Thai. These findings also suggest that one reason ethnic mobilization doesn’t 
occur is that Isan people adhere so strongly to Thai-ness that purely ethnic appeals may struggle to gain 
traction.  
 
The data collected in the surveys, though, fails to tell us much about the interaction between the Thai 
and Isan identity, as well as the propensity for Isan people to gauge the strength of one identity over the 
other. As such, in addition to these surveys, I turn to a series of semi-structured interviews carried out 
with khon Isan, examining how these individuals perceive the Thai identity.   
  
Surveys  
Between 2007 and 2014, the Asian Barometer (AB)61 and the World Values Survey (WVS)62 
conducted four large-scale surveys in Thailand, recording the primary language spoken at home by their 
respondents, allowing us to identify speakers of central Thai and phasa Isan, as reported in table 1. By 
comparing responses to survey questions between different ethnolinguistic groups in Thailand, we are 
able to test the extent to which the Thai state’s nation-building efforts have been successful. For 
instance, if we see that phasa Isan speakers consistently score feelings of national identity lower than 
their central Thai-speaking counterparts, as one might expect from an economically disadvantaged 
group,63 then we might question the degree to which integration efforts were successful. On the other 
hand, if we see that Isan people respond to questions of national identity similarly to central Thai 
speakers despite the economic and social disadvantages they face as Thai citizens, we can be more 
confident that Isan people have integrated Thai-ness as part of their identities.   
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While neither the AB nor the WVS is expressly concerned with national identity formation, both surveys 
ask several questions that can be used to gauge feelings of national integration. The most prominent of 
these is a question about a respondent’s level of pride in being a citizen of Thailand, which was asked 
in all four surveys.64 Thais in general are quite proud of their nation, with over 80 percent of respondents 
scoring themselves as “Very Proud” to be Thai. Even so, there is a small amount of variation between 
the language groups. By dividing the sample between those who speak central Thai and those who 
speak phasa Isan at home, we can test whether there is a statistically significant difference between their 
responses. In all four of these survey rounds, phasa Isan speakers, on average, ranked their pride in the 
nation as higher than native central Thai speakers. Difference of means scores are shown in figure 1 
along with their confidence intervals, demonstrating that the gap between phasa Isan speakers and 
central Thai speakers is statistically significant. Further data analysis also shows that Isan people scored 
significantly higher on these responses than the other ethnolinguistic groups (Khammuang and 
Paktay).65 While degrees are small due to the overwhelmingly positive feelings of Thais about their 
national identity, the results demonstrate that Isan people, despite their history of exclusion from the 
Thai body politic, feel positively about their Thai national identity. Indeed, from all four surveys, only 
a total of nine phasa Isan speakers indicated that they were less than proud to be Thai, with eight of 
these responses occurring in 2014 after the most recent coup wherein Yingluck Shinawatra, who was 
very popular in Isan, was deposed by the military. Such a small swing of only eight respondents 
indicates the strength of national pride among Isan people. The remaining 1,748 Isan language-speaking 
respondents spread throughout all four surveys claimed that they were either very proud or quite proud 
to be Thai.   
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Other questions in the surveys provide additional insights into feelings of national identity that vary 
between ethnic groups in Thailand. In both waves of the WVS, respondents were asked the degree to 
which they agreed with the statement, “I see myself as part of the Thai nation [khit wa toneng pen 
suannueng khong chat Thai].” The overwhelming response among respondents was to either strongly 
agree or agree with the statement; in wave 5 the scores totaled 96.4 percent of responses and in wave 6 
the number was 95.8 percent. In both cases, though, Isan people again showed their identification with 
the Thai nation, with 99.4 and 98.5 percent of phasa Isan speakers providing affirmative scores to the 
question in the respective waves. Across both waves of the survey, only nine out of 897 phasa Isan 
speakers expressed the feeling that they were not part of the Thai nation. Again, when compared with 
central Thai speakers using a difference of means test, phasa Isan speakers were statistically more likely 
to either strongly agree or agree that they were part of the Thai nation, related in figure 2.  
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The third and fourth wave of the AB surveys included a set of questions that allow us to develop a 
composite variable measuring feelings of nationalism.66 The creation of this continuous variable gives 
us another opportunity to test the degree to which Isan language speakers exhibit commitment to 
Thailand and the Thai identity relative to all other survey respondents. I do this through a simple linear 
regression model, which included control variables for gender, age, education level, income level, and 
whether the respondent lived in an urban area. The results demonstrate that respondents who speak 
phasa Isan at home exhibit higher levels of identification with the Thai nation than their compatriots 
who speak other mother tongues, even when controlling for a set of demographic variables.67 In other 
words, this test gives us greater confidence that being a phasa Isan speaker is positively correlated with 
higher levels of nationalistic feeling. The data from these large-scale surveys support the claim that the 
clear majority of Isan people have internalized the Thai state’s efforts to imbue all citizens with a sense 
of Thai-ness. If the government’s efforts to inculcate a Thai identity into the people of northeastern 
Thailand had not been successful, we would have expected these survey results to exhibit lower levels 
of national pride among phasa Isan speakers in comparison with those who speak central Thai at home. 
The results, though, show the opposite: Isan people display greater commitment to the national identity 
than native speakers of central Thai. Even though these differences are small, they provide strong 
evidence that Isan people are proud to be Thai.   
  
Semi-Structured Interviews  
To better understand this phenomenon, during three short research trips to Thailand in December 2016, 
and April and July 2017, I conducted a series of semi-structured interviews with 23 individuals who 
identify as khon Isan.68 As my goal was to speak with respondents from a variety of life circumstances, 
interviewees were chosen through two methods. First, I approached personal contacts who identified as 
Isan people to obtain their feedback and, via a snowballing process, obtained respondents. Second, I 
used street-contacting to identify Isanlanguage speakers and to invite them for an interview.69 
Interviewees included highlyeducated and relatively wealthy individuals as well as those with only a 
primary school education in the lowest income bracket; four interviewees were living in Bangkok while 
the remainder were based in the northeast.70 Interviews were conducted in central Thai, with some 
phasa Isan phrases sprinkled throughout, and were recorded before being translated and transcribed in 
English by the author.71 Confirming the findings of the large-scale surveys, all interviewees expressed 
a strong and abiding commitment to the national Thai identity. I adopted the same question as the large-
scale surveys, “How proud are you to be Thai? (khun rusuek phumchai nai khwampen/sanchat Thai 
thueng phiang dai),” before asking them to explain. Typical responses included the following:   
  
I’m very proud. Because I have read about our history as a nation coming from our ancestors. 
We were never colonized. Even though we’re not very wealthy, we are very proud … . I believe 
it’s very lucky that I was born in Thailand … . I am from Sisaket, which is almost in Cambodia, 
so I was almost born a Cambodian. But I was born in Thailand and am Thai.72  
 
I am extremely proud of being Thai (phumchai mak thisut)  
… because I was born under the 9th monarch of the Chakri Dynasty!73  
  
All interviewees expressed feelings of Thai nationalism, and some repeatedly highlighted their efforts 
to express their Thai identity over their Isan-ness (khawmpen Isan). Others incorporated their Isan-ness 
within a broader Thai identity. This was, in part, due to the positive benefits interviewees perceived to 
come from being Thai rather than khon Isan. For instance, one respondent spoke of avoiding using 
phasa Isan due to his career. As a teacher, he argued, he should only use formal language to set a good 
example for others and maintain the respect of his students. His Isan-ness needed to be subsumed within 
his Thai-ness during work and other formal interactions; only when with close friends or family did he 
feel he could be fully khon Isan.74 Similarly, a financial manager for a law office explained that he 
used Isan language in a strategic fashion. During everyday interactions, he might use phasa Isan,  
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… but when I need to give [subordinates] instructions for work, then I give instructions in Thai. 
That’s more formal and clear. Then they know that they must do the work. So, it depends on 
the situation. Usually if someone speaks phasa Isan with me, I’ll use phasa Isan with them, 
except when we need to talk about something formal. I … switch directly to Thai. People who 
work at the office, they know that I’m the boss, so they will only speak Thai with me. It’s like 
from the time we were in school. Students always had to use Thai with the teacher, even when 
the teacher was khon Isan. Anything formal in life needs to be done in Thai.75  
  
Most respondents explained that they used Isan language throughout the majority of their daily 
interactions, but they would switch to Thai when contacting government officials or conducting any 
official business. Thai identity and language thus become symbols of education, wealth, refinement, 
and higher social status. This is evidence of the effect of positive inducements developed by the Thai 
state wherein the government-approved Thai identity sits atop a hierarchy of potential identities. The 
positive inducements or necessities of adopting a Thai identity result in efforts by Isan people to limit 
the use of their own mother tongue. A Bangkokbased taxi driver from Maha Sarakham explained:   
  
… whenever we need to communicate something, we must use Thai. Phasa Isan is only our 
regional language. Old people use the language, but some of the younger people today almost 
can’t speak phasa Isan… in Bangkok, we must use Thai. In my family, between husband and 
wife, we use phasa Isan, but with our children we try to promote Thai. Sometimes our children 
will speak to us in phasa Isan, and they understand it. But they don’t speak it like in the past.76  
  
Another respondent related that his parents had taken pains to only speak central Thai with him as he 
grew up:   
My parents speak phasa Isan, but they don’t speak it with us [children] … you’ll often see urban 
Isan people try not to speak phasa Isan with their kids … . If a child starts speaking phasa Isan 
they’ll have an accent. You can distinguish them and tell because they won’t speak clear and 
proper central Thai. [Fear of an accent] might be the reason.77  
  
Some respondents observed that fewer young people were speaking phasa Isan in their public lives and 
some had completely abandoned it in favour of central Thai. One young woman planned to speak 
primarily central Thai with her future children:  
  
They need to be prepared to do well in school using Thai … schools use central Thai, and I 
want [the children] to follow the same pattern as their classmates. I don’t want them to have 
problems in their life … . So it’s better to use the central language in childhood.78  
  
Many Isan people, then, are striving to embrace the Thai identity to access the economic and social 
benefits that come from being Thai.  
 
At the same time as positive inducements encourage the adoption of the Thai identity, negative 
repercussions of being khon Isan also deter the growth of the identity. Such adverse effects include 
broad narratives that Isan people are socially less desirable than the metropolitan central Thais of 
Bangkok. These narratives were adopted by some respondents. An entrepreneur born in Roi Et who had 
relocated to Bangkok and had supported the yellow shirt movement explained that Isan people were 
poorly educated and easily led about by politicians.79 Multiple respondents acknowledged that there 
was a negative stigma assigned to being khon Isan. One related:   
    
 I know that some people from other regions look down on phasa Isan speakers ...  They’ll call 
them Lao or siao, and I know they’re being insulting. In reality most Isan people are Lao. But 
central Thai people won’t say it to your face.80  
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Negative social shaming has a powerful effect on the feelings of Isan people and their willingness to 
publicly identify as Lao. Another interviewee further explained:   
    
  Most of us don’t want to be called “ai lao.” People call us that. It’s not very nice and  the 
central Thai people call us that. They also don’t speak proper or polite central Thai with us … 
. They like to look down on other regions.81  
  
Interestingly, one woman from Maha Sarakham claimed that the individuals who engage in the greatest 
social shaming are people originally from the northeast who have moved to Bangkok and adopted the 
Bangkok identity and subsequently mock their former home: “Isan is not developed and is full of yokels 
(khon bannok).”82  
 
Even so, this shaming did not result in any retaliatory claims that Isan people’s rights to speak their 
native language or identity as khon Isan were being violated. Instead, respondents accepted this as a 
fact of life and echoed the government’s calls for unity among all Thais. One argued, “We need to try 
and be united. We’re all Thai people, we can all use Thai together. We can’t force [central Thais] to 
speak phasa Isan … we can try to get them to accept our Isan-ness. That’s better than getting angry.”83 
Another claimed that any tension between Isan people and central Thais was the result of politicians 
trying to stir up support rather than any violation of Isan people’s identity or rights. Indeed, tensions 
between the northeast and the central region, according to the respondent, were because “khon Isan will 
sometimes easily believe things.”84 Among all interviewees there were no discussions of rights for Isan 
people to use the Isan language or identify publicly as khon Isan. When asked whether phasa Isan should 
be taught formally in schools, the majority of respondents replied with a resounding no. There was, 
though, an undertone of resentment during some discussion about the treatment of Isan people. One 
explained that during his younger years working in Bangkok, he was frequently subject to insult and 
ridicule by central Thais for being khon Isan, but the only response available was to “be quiet and just 
endure it.”85 One young man from Udon Thani province explained:   
    
  I think it’s Isan that pays [for the happiness of Thailand]. First, we see that Isan  people are the 
most populous of the country. Second, Isan people are the ones who go to work everywhere 
else in the country. The region that benefits the most is central region. First, they are the bosses. 
Second, they have a nice life already. If we go and work for them, we don’t have the right to 
oppose or cause problems because we are employed by them.86  
  
These feelings of resentment, though, appear to simmer beneath a cover of Thai unity, and importantly, 
all respondents were quick to reassert their Thai-ness.  
 
Despite both the positive inducements to adopt central Thai and the negative connotations of Isan-ness, 
respondents all expressed some degree of pride in their Isan identity. One native of Kalasin said, “My 
Isan identity is stronger than my Thai identity … Isan-ness is part of being Thai, but [Isan] is where I’m 
from and I feel it deeper.”87 The feelings of unity and closeness among Isan people were reinforced by 
the use of Isan language, a love of Isan food, and belief in common Isan practices which differed from 
those of the central Thais. Interviewees argued, though, that there was little separating Isan and Thai 
identity. A street vendor in Khon Kaen, who laughed as she declared herself to be “authentically Lao 
(lao thae thae),” also repeatedly affirmed that she was proud to be Thai and felt herself part of the Thai 
nation.88 A native of Sakon Nakhorn, when asked to gauge whether she was more proud of being Thai 
or being khon Isan, retorted:   
  
  I have to explain to you that Isan people are Thai. There’s not a separation. If we are  proud of 
our Isan-ness, we are also proud of our Thai-ness because Isan people are Thai people.89  
  
She was not alone in this belief. Other respondents explained that they were distinct from the Lao across 
the Mekhong, despite acknowledging a shared history. The use of the term “Isan” became important in 
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these discussions, as being Isan allowed respondents to differentiate between themselves as Thais and 
the Lao living in Laos. While many acknowledged speaking Lao, most insisted that they were Isan 
people. The ethnic identity of Lao has been  largely set aside in favour of an Isan identity which is 
subsumed within the Thai identity.  
 
Finally, I also spoke with respondents about the use of Isan language in political messages to gauge 
their feelings about potential ethnic mobilization. Respondents were split on their support of the use of 
phasa Isan in political discourse. Most acknowledged that using the tongue would be electorally 
beneficial in local campaigning, and many expressed the belief that a politician who spoke phasa Isan 
would be more familiar with voters’ challenges and concerns. At the same time, though, almost all 
respondents who answered the line of questions quickly turned to a discussion of national needs for 
clear communication across regions. A native of Udon Thani offered a typical response:   
    
We have six regions in Thailand, and each uses a different language. They are very  different 
languages. If you just use phasa Isan, then not everyone can understand… People need to use 
the central language. There’s something that is necessary to pull everyone together, and that’s 
Thai.90  
  
Multiple respondents further argued that on the national stage, ethnic language as well as a focus on the 
region was inappropriate, instead emphasizing the needs of the Thai nation rather than the needs of the 
Isan region; a young woman explained, “[members of parliament] are supposed to represent the entire 
country.”91 While phasa Isan could be used locally, respondents felt that at the government level the 
identity should give way to a national focus, and communication between Thais was more important 
than promoting Isan-ness.  
 
The data gathered from these interviews largely confirms the claim that the efforts of the Thai state to 
impose a Thai identity upon Isan people has been a success. Respondents have accepted and adopted 
the Thai identity in an effort to gain the economic and social benefits that come with using Thai as well 
as avoid the negative social stigma associated with being assigned an alternative ethnic identity. In 
effect, the Thai state’s social engineering has worked.  
  
Conclusion  
Ethnic conflict motivates a great deal of academic research.92 Ashutosh Varshney argues, though, that 
“until we study ethnic peace, we will not be able to have a good theory of ethnic conflict.”93 As such, 
the ethnic Lao people’s espousal of the Thai identity and the absence of politicized ethnic cleavages 
provides an important contribution to the understanding of how state action can result in peaceful 
cohabitation. While research on the conflict in Thailand’s Deep South demonstrates the state’s 
weakness in assimilating that population,94 it is the successful incorporation of the Lao in the Northeast 
that gives us greater insight into the capacity of states to defuse ethnic tensions.  
 
The ethnically Lao people of Isan have become proud to be Thai. Statistically, on average, they are 
more proud of being Thai than native speakers of central Thai. This strong identification with the Thai 
nation is a result of the century-long effort by the Thai state to encourage adoption of the government-
approved central Thai identity in conjunction with the brutal suppression of alternate systems of 
identification within the boundaries of the Thai state. As such, there has been little room for political 
appeals that might threaten this unified Thai identity, including political parties or movements based on 
regional identities. In other words, the demand for such political activities has been largely absent from 
modern Thai politics.  
 
This demonstrates the capacity of states to shape identity. Through nation-building and homogenizing 
language instruction, the Thai state has convinced the vast majority of the Lao people within its 
boundaries to ascribe to the Thai nation. In doing so, they reinforce the ethnic hierarchy of the state-
approved Thai identity. Those who have moved into the upper classes adopt Standard Thai when 
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addressing their social subordinates, demonstrating their closeness to the metropole. Isan people who 
inhabit the lower rungs of the social ladder strive to help their children speak the Thai language and 
adopt the central accent to be more fluent as Thais. Combined with the social ostracism and political 
threat that may come from being labelled “non-Thai,” these pressures reduce the demand for ethnicity-
based political mobilization. Thus, the peace between the Lao and the Thai is a success story in 
achieving ethnic harmony, albeit one partly based on a history of violent suppression of alternate ethnic 
identities that continues today.  
 
The current strength of Thai nationalism potentially provides space for regional identities to flourish 
without them turning into centripetal forces leading to balkanization. While recent work suggests that 
possible tensions may emerge between khon Isan and the Thai state,95 the findings presented here show 
that Isan people continue to incorporate their ethnic identity within the Thai hierarchy, indicating that 
Isan mobilization will likely remain constrained by ardent nationalism. As such, concerns over 
separatism are largely overblown.96 Isan people are proud to be Thai, and they imagine themselves as 
part of the Thai nation. They are also proud of their Isan-ness. Although their identity is coherent and 
distinct, Isan people see it as naturally fitting within the broader Thai identity, and, as such, it is not a 
threat to the Thai nation. Indeed, counter to the fears of a paranoid military, the aggregation of political 
demands from Isan derives from the desire to obtain political voice combined with a strong loyalty to 
Thailand rather than any attempt at a secessionist exit. 97  
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